BOOZE & OPIUM DEN &

Pookah & Kangeroo Shoppe

"Chings are always hopping at Dynamite Dave"s"

Eastmount

Knocknacree Road Dalkey Dublin, Ireland

Dear Kurt,

Good to hear from you again!

Things are more than usually chaotic and Erisian right now. After the last US lecture tour (Feb.-April), we came back here with the plan of getting untangled and repacked and returning to the States permanently by July. Various things intervened. I have a European tour coming up (Ternberg, Austria, then a nature park in Real Bavaria, then Zurich and Basel in Switzerland, then Berlin and Hamburg). We are caretaking a house for a doctor who has moved to London for the

summer. (That cottage in Howth was supposed to be temporary, until we found something to buy. We decided not to buy. Meanwhile, this place is ten times bigger than the Howth cottage.) Arlen has signed up for some post-surgical therapy she can get cheaper here than in the States. With so much happening so quickly, I can only say that what will happen next is that I will be back in the States on about 20 July to do the new lecture/seminar tour and I THINK Arlen will join me at the tour's end in September and we will stay with friends in Palos Verdes

until we find a place of our own.

Unless I get hired to write a BBC series, which does not seem likely right now, but has been talked about...in which case we will take a flat in London in September, for at least a while.

everybody everytime. Quite a few people like it, and quite a few can't stand it, and that's true of all my books -- probably of all of anybody's books. I fear me, I fear me, but it seems there are more like that, and like **The New Inquisition**, probably on the way. I find polemic one of the most exhilerating ways to communicate my "vision" or my lunacy or whatever it is. Banging my ideas against somebody else's ideas seems to me to produce lovely dialectical sparks. Straight exposition, as in **Prometheus**, seems to me to merely produce popular science or journalism. Dialectical conflict seems to raise me or excite me to the level of real philosophy. Sorry. We all have our illusions and that's one of mine, currently.

I assume you recognize that the position expressed in those two polemics is the same as that expressed in my other works, and is my own development from Nietzsche's radical existentialism, Hussert's phenomenology, Bridgman's operationalism, Wittgenstein's linguistic analysis, Bohr's Copenhagen Interpretation and the Transactional school of psychology. Having made this synthesis, i think it important to develop its full philosophical ramifications, for two reasons.

1. One side of this tradition, the scientific side (derived from Wittgenstein-Bohr-Bridgman), is rather ignorant of and hostile to the other side, the humanist-literary side (derived from Nietzsche, Husserl, and the later and to me inferior existentialists and

deconstructionists) and that side in turn seems ignorant of and hostile to the scientific side. I think that by constantly playing both

sides I have a contribution to make, in showing that the two are more closely related than is generally realized.

2. By developing this system further, and banging it against various tradtional systems, I think I am highlighting the basic defects that underlie the gross errors that dominate politics and religion and conventional thought generally. That is, I think the world is run by rulers and populated by followers who are all Platonists and/or Aristotelians without even having studied those philosophies. By challenging the Platonic/Aristotelian systems, I am, I think, doing a kind of sociological psychotherapy or sewer cleaning.

Or, more simply, by combining existentialism with operationalism and setting them against the various forms of closet Aristotelianism still surviving, I am trying to set off the kind of intellectual bombshell that is the philosophic equivelent of actually persuading my readers to really do the exercizes in **Prometheus**.

I am amused more than aghast that you confuse my position with solipsism. Shea has confused it with solipsism for 15 years or more and we argue about that regularly. Einstein confused this position with solipsism, also, and his 30-year debate with Bohr was based on the notion that Cophenhagenism is solipsism. Other physicists still accuse Wheeler of solipsism. It seems rather hard to convey that transactionalism is not the solipsist pole of the Aristotelian-solipsist either/or but is alternative. I have tried to explain this dozens of ways in all my books, and the fact that some people still don't get it just shows (I think) the extent to which the Aristotelian dualism still controls Western thought. Einstein didn't understand this position even after 30 years of debating it with Bohr.

Let me try again, using the Fuller optical argument that you find faulty. You actually agree with Fuller that the images are inside our heads, but you then add that the images come from things outside our heads. That,

just what the diagram shows; look at that page of the book again. The point is that the images are **not** the things. In fact, things may not exist at all. It seems, right now, more accurate to say the images come from space-time events than from things, as I say in the text. The point is that the "things" are projections onto space-time events of the images in our heads. All we see are the thingified images in our heads; we don't know what's out there. It may be best described as space-time events right now, but it will probably be described in other metaphors when new discoveries are made.

You look at a space-time event and see a thing which you call a chair. A snake looks at it and sees a heat field, not a thing, and probably does not call it by a name. An electron microscope looks at it and sees empty space with such peculiar twinkles that attempting to explain them leads to all the

paradoxes of quantum mechanics. What is "really" there? I don't know, but I rather doubt that it "is" a Platonic Idea or an Aristotelian Essense or even a Kantian ding an sich. Operationally-existentially what is "real" for us is what we encounter and endure, but that is not "real" in any absolute sense. In the Buddhist epistemology, the chair is real — to your nervous system. The chair is not real — to the electron microscope. The chair is both real

The chair is not real -- to the electron microscope. The chair is both real and not-real, because your image and the microscope's image are not contradictory but, in Bohr's phrase, complimentary. The chair is neither real nor not-real, because it has infinite aspects not containable in either your image or the microscope's image.

The "real" "thing" of which chair and heat field and twinkles are images may exist somewhere, in some Platonic or Aristotelian realm, as I cheerfully and repeatedly admit, but, as Nietzsche and Bridgman both demonstrated by different arguments, since we cannot contact those realms, it is meaningless to talk about them. What we can talk meaningfully about is our existence and our operations — what our brains encounter and endure and what our instruments encounter and endure. As Heisenberg said to Bohr, Einstein's continued attempt to go beyond that existential-operational level to a Platonic "reality" sounds to us skeptics

much like the medieval debate over how many angels can dance on the

head of a pin.

Study the more complicated optical-neurlogical diagram on page 9, please, and then re-read the exposition of pages 9-12 s 1 o w 1 y.

An inner city Dublin man told me, "Dalkey? Sure, that's the end of the world. Sure it's the last place God made and he threw his shovel away afterwards. " We are all of nine miles from downtown Dublin, so that is a major journey in the minds of Dublin City people.

Well, I must be chugging along... So So So So Con (As you can see, I am very keen on my new fonts and typefaces...)

Reep the lasagna flying,

SLACK Ø

Robert Anton Wilson

Bob 1/1

DO NOT USE THESE PAGES AS TOILET TISSUE THIS MAY BE AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

